Abstract

Over the decade following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia's exchange regime has exhibited a notable divergence between its de jure and de facto classifications. While Tunisian authorities have predominantly claimed adherence to a floating exchange regime—except during 2013–2015—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) consistently classified it as a crawl-like regime, except in 2017. This discrepancy, though not unique to Tunisia, is noteworthy given the nation’s post-revolution shift from dictatorship to democracy, a system that ostensibly demands greater transparency and accountability. The IMF’s adoption of a de facto classification framework since 1999 aimed to address such inconsistencies, yet the persistence of this divergence in Tunisia raises an important question: does this dichotomy reflect an enduring reality of Tunisia’s exchange rate policy, or is it a byproduct of limitations in the IMF’s classification methodology? This paper explores Tunisia's de facto exchange regime over the post-revolution decade. The first section provides a theoretical review of the factors contributing to divergences between de facto and de jure exchange regimes. The second section employs descriptive statistics and econometric models to empirically verify the nature of Tunisia's exchange regime during this period. By bridging theory with empirical evidence, this study seeks to contribute to the broader discourse on exchange regime transparency and its implications for economic governance in transitioning democracies.